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Abstract
The federal system of governance has been posited as a solution to issues of internal conflict and division
within states. Over the last century the global prevalence of the federal system has increased. There are
currently twenty-six states (accounting for forty per cent of the global population) that have or are in the
process of adopting a federal system—including three of the so-called “BRIC” emerging global powers. While
the motivating theory of the federal system is one that often seeks to pacify, contain, or eliminate conflict
among subnational groups and governments, such an ideal is not as easily achieved in practice. Many federal
states are formed amidst conflict and competing visions of national identity. Thus, it is often not only the
division of power and resources within the federation that is contested but also the framework of the
federation itself. This underlying struggle is borne out in political arenas through self-determination
movements and in courts through legal disputes over division of powers. In turn, states rely on federal
institutions to proactively and reactively address intra-state conflict. Situated among these institutions are
“federal arbiters” who serve the critical role of adjudicating conflicts over power and resources.
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The Judicial Role in a Diverse Federation: 
Lessons from the Supreme Court of 
Canada, by Robert Schertzer1
KIRANDEEP MAHAL2
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE has been posited as a solution to issues 
of internal conflict and division within states.3 Over the last century the global 
prevalence of the federal system has increased. There are currently twenty-six states 
(accounting for forty per cent of the global population) that have or are in the 
process of adopting a federal system4—including three of the so-called “BRIC” 
emerging global powers. While the motivating theory of the federal system is 
one that often seeks to pacify, contain, or eliminate conflict among subnational 
groups and governments, such an ideal is not as easily achieved in practice. 
Many federal states are formed amidst conflict and competing visions of national 
identity. Thus, it is often not only the division of power and resources within the 
federation that is contested but also the framework of the federation itself. This 
underlying struggle is borne out in political arenas through self-determination 
movements and in courts through legal disputes over division of powers. In turn, 
states rely on federal institutions to proactively and reactively address intra-state 
conflict. Situated among these institutions are “federal arbiters” who serve the 
critical role of adjudicating conflicts over power and resources.
1. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) 306 pages.
2. JD Candidate (2018), Osgoode Hall Law School.
3. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 35-36.
4. Ibid at 7, n 11. “BRIC” is an acronym in economics that refers to the countries of Brazil, 
Russia, India and China.
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In The Judicial Role in a Diverse Federation: Lessons from the Supreme Court of 
Canada, Robert Schertzer employs Canada and its Supreme Court as a case study 
to examine the role of apex courts as federal arbiters managing national diversity 
and conflict. Working from two foundational premises—the impetus on federal 
institutions to generate legitimacy for the federation and the inherently contested 
nature of the federation—Schertzer’s book integrates a novel theoretical approach 
to viewing the role of apex courts as federal arbiters with an in-depth empirical 
analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s federalism jurisprudence. Drawing 
from 131 Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decisions spanning three decades, 
Schertzer’s analysis suggests that the SCC has managed conflict over national 
identity and the federation “in both problematic and beneficial ways.”5
Schertzer’s book addresses a “relatively under examined and under theorized” 
area in federal theory—the role of federal arbiters in “comparative federal and 
conflict management studies.”6 In this respect, the focus on Canada is advantageous 
and it follows a trend in comparative federalism of recognizing Canada as a key 
case.7 Firstly, Schertzer frames Canada as a plurinational federation in which 
members of the federation do not subscribe to one single, unifying definition of 
the nation.8 Schertzer identifies three dominant federal models that emerge from 
scholarship on Canadian federalism and can be discerned in SCC jurisprudence: 
pan-Canadian, provincial equality, and multinational.9 Secondly, the SCC is 
often called upon to mediate federalism disputes, which has led to a significant 
5. Ibid at 8-9.
6. Ibid at 62.
7. See e.g. Thomas O Hueglin & Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry, 2nd 
ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015); Gerald Baier, Courts and Federalism: Judicial 
Doctrine in the United States, Australia, and Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); Michael 
Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006); Jan Erk, 
Explaining Federalism: State, Society and Congruence in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany 
and Switzerland, (New York: Routledge, 2008); Jan Erk & Lawrence M Anderson, eds, The 
Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? (New York: 
Routledge, 2010).
8. Ibid at 7. On plurinationalism, see Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless 
Nations in a Post-sovereignty Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also Ferran 
Requejo & Miquel Caminal Badia, eds, Federalism, Plurinationality and Democratic 
Constitutionalism: Theory and Cases (New York: Routledge, 2012); Ugo M Amoretti 
& Nancy Bermeo, eds, Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004).
9. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 48. Schertzer draws primarily from the work of François Rocher 
and Miriam Smith. François Rocher & Miriam Smith, “The Four Dimensions of Canadian 
Federalism,” in François Rocher & Miriam Smith, eds, New Trends in Canadian Federalism, 
2nd ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 21 at 22, 38-40.
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body of jurisprudence spanning a range of division of powers issues. In recent 
decades, questions of critical constitutional importance have been referred to 
the SCC during deeply divided political and social points in Canadian history.10
It would come as no surprise to those familiar with the Supreme Court of 
Canada that it has significantly influenced the development of the federation 
of Canada.11 What is perhaps less understood is how the SCC carries out its 
role as federal arbiter and the corresponding impact it has on the legitimacy of 
differing views of the federation and of the federation itself.12 This is the gap 
in the literature that Schertzer’s work meticulously fills through theoretical and 
empirical rigour.
Schertzer argues that federal arbiters, in fulfilling their conflict management 
duties, hold a “special status”13 in the development of the federation and the 
maintenance of its legitimacy in diverse states. Schertzer contends that federal 
arbiters are a part of the “very system being challenged.” Thus, when they are 
faced with adjudicating challenges to the federal system the legitimacy of the 
federal arbiter itself also hangs in the balance.14 The ways in which apex courts 
manage conflict “can either negatively affect the legitimacy of the federal system 
or generate legitimacy.”15
Schertzer’s focus on legitimacy is of particular note in understanding the 
arguments advanced in the book. Schertzer defines legitimacy as “the belief in, 
and acceptance of, the validity of a form of political association”16 and argues that 
perceptions of legitimacy act as either a unifying or destabilizing force within a 
federation. Thus, in order to reap the benefits of a federal system, legitimacy must 
remain a central focus of institutional actors in managing conflict.
10. See e.g. Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753, 125 DLR (3d) 1; Re: 
Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 SCR 793, 140 DLR 
(3d) 385; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Secession 
Reference]; Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837; Reference re Senate 
Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704.
11. See e.g. Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical 
Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) ch 6; John T Saywell, The 
Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2002); Katherine E Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism: 
The Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
12. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 276.
13. Ibid at 68.
14. Ibid at 6.
15. Ibid at 62.
16. Ibid at 11.
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I. RECONCEPTUALISING THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL 
ARBITER
While federal theory and Canadian federalism jurisprudence have been the 
subject of significant scholarly interest, Schertzer’s book fills gaps within and 
across these areas of scholarship. Schertzer bridges the divide between theories of 
the federal system and judicial review, forming links “between each ideal role for 
the judiciary and [an ideal] federal approach and model.”17 Part I of The Judicial 
Role in a Diverse Federation draws on general federal theory to discuss how states 
approach the issue of national diversity.
In chapter two, this theoretical framework is applied to the dominant 
federal models in Canada: pan-Canadian, provincial equality, and multinational. 
Schertzer takes these models a step further by articulating the conceptualization 
of the role of the judiciary that is embedded in each model. The pan-Canadian 
model places the central government as the locus of a “single, comprehensive civic 
political identity.”18 Under this framework the judiciary is called upon to act as a 
neutral, independent umpire “adjudicating…in accordance with pre-established 
rules.”19 The provincial equality model supports a decentralized view of the state 
in which provinces “represent the primary political community of belonging”20 
and the judiciary is seen as a branch of government providing checks and balances 
to power.21 The multinational model views Canada as comprised of multiple 
nations for whom power sharing and autonomy are justified.22 Sub-nations are 
defined either as ethno-national units (e.g., Quebec, Nunavut, and Aboriginal 
communities) or as provincial territorial units.23 The judiciary is viewed as a 
guardian protecting the constitutional and federal system.24
Schertzer argues that these existing dominant approaches fail to account 
for the “federal structure itself [being] contested,” and thereby overlook how 
imposing a particular federal approach and model affects the legitimacy of the 
federation.25 Drawing from these shortcomings, Schertzer advances a new federal 
17. Ibid at 80.
18. Ibid at 50.
19. Ibid at 77.
20. Ibid at 50-51.
21. Ibid at 78.
22. Ibid at 51-52.
23. Ibid at 52.
24. Ibid at 79.
25. Ibid at 80.
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model “that sees federal systems as the process and outcome of negotiation” in which 
the federal arbiter’s role is that of a broad facilitator of negotiation.26
This “ideal model” rejects the prioritization of one view of the federation 
above others; instead it moves towards recognizing a dynamic federation in 
which courts aim to facilitate “negotiation and political compromise.”27 Schertzer 
suggests that the federal arbiter can facilitate this model by either (1) pushing 
the conflicting parties back into political negotiations or (2) rejecting a zero-sum 
approach to conflict resolution by reaching an outcome that validates and 
accounts for competing perspectives.28
While this ideal model encourages compromise and dialogue within the 
federation, the reality is that often negotiation may not be a viable option for 
disputes that reach the level of the apex court. Further, the impetus to reject a 
zero-sum outcome must be balanced with the expectation on courts to deliver 
decisions with clear directives for the parties on the question(s) before them. 
The strength of Schertzer’s approach lies in its recognition that the influence 
of the federal arbiter does not rest solely with the disposition of the conflict. 
Rather it is embedded in the way the decision is rendered. The manner in which 
the apex court depicts the federation, reinforces this depiction through legal 
argument, and recognizes that “continued disagreement is reasonable” influences 
the legitimacy of its decision to parties beyond the clear “winner.”29 In this way, 
it is open to the apex court to validate the contested nature of the federation and 
render decisions in which the plurality of views of the federation may find fruit 
for future conflict management.
Part II of the book leads off this point and demonstrates how this ideal 
model has been achieved in practice through an examination of SCC 
federalism jurisprudence.
II. EXAMINING THIRTY YEARS OF SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA FEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCE
Canadian legal scholarship has benefited from a robust body of study concerning 
the role the SCC has had in the development of the Canadian federation; however, 
much of this scholarship focuses on the impacts of specific decisions, doctrines, 
26. Ibid at 83 [emphasis added].
27. Ibid at 93.
28. Ibid at 93-94.
29. Ibid at 97.
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eras, or personalities of the Court.30 This is understandably so, given the sheer 
breadth of cases touching on issues of federalism. In The Judicial Role in a Diverse 
Federation, Schertzer views the Court as an institution and rises to the challenge of 
taking a deep dive into Canadian federalism jurisprudence.31 Schertzer achieves 
this by undertaking an empirical analysis spanning 131 decisions rendered by the 
Supreme Court of Canada from 1980–2010.32 Beyond the analysis specific to 
this book, Schertzer’s work provides a set of tabulated data that not only advances 
an understanding of how the Court has managed federalism conflicts, but that 
may also serve as a rich foundation for future research on Canadian federalism.
In Part II of the book, the theoretical foundation set out in Part I is applied 
to develop an empirical framework through which trends in the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s management of conflict are identified. Schertzer’s framework takes a 
case-by-case, granular, and detail-oriented approach. Schertzer analyzes how the 
federation is depicted in order to determine which federal model(s) have found 
favour with the Court and identifies the constitutional modalities33 employed in 
the legal argumentation. The framework also assesses the judgments’ outcomes 
and the role assumed by the Court in each case.
30. See e.g. Wade K Wright, “Facilitating Intergovernmental Dialogue: Judicial Review of the 
Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 51 SCLR (2d) 625; Nathalie 
Des Rosiers, “From Québec Veto to Québec Secession: The Evolution of the Supreme 
Court of Canada on Québec-Canada Disputes” (2000) 13:2 Can JL & Jur 171; Gordon 
DiGiacomo, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Federalism as Expressed in the Securities 
Reference” (2012) Queen’s University Institute for Intergovernmental Relations Working 
Paper No 2012/01; Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The ‘Principle’ of Federalism and 
the Legacy of Patriation and Quebec Veto References” (2011) 54 SCLR 77.
31. Schertzer recognizes that while the views of individual judges may help to explain “why 
the Court shifts its conception of the federation over time” the Court’s power ultimately 
is derived from “the normative force it wields as the apex court of the [Canadian] judicial 
system.” Ibid at 110. Recent scholarship suggests that a view of the Court as an “institution” 
may be apt and appropriate for the SCC. See Emmett Macfarlane, “Consensus and 
Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 52 SCLR (2d) 379 (on unanimous 
judgments in the Supreme Court of Canada); Peter McCormick “‘By the Court’: The Untold 
Story of a Canadian Judicial Innovation” (2016) 53:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 1048 (on the rise of 
judgments by “THE COURT”).
32. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 113-14.
33. Constitutional modalities are “method(s) through which legal propositions about the 
constitution are given a meaning” (e.g., historical, doctrinal, textual, and progressive 
approaches). See ibid at 125-26. Schertzer builds on the taxonomy employed by Philip 
Bobbitt (ibid at 125). See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
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The rigour of Schertzer’s analysis is exemplified in chapter four of the book 
in which a discussion of the Reference Re Secession of Quebec (Secession Reference)34 
provides a window into the application of the new empirical framework. Using 
the Secession Reference as the benchmark embodying the “ideal model,” Schertzer 
identifies two streams of jurisprudence—one in which the SCC imposes a 
particular view of the federation and one in which the SCC reinforces the 
legitimacy of multiple views.
The Court rendered the Secession Reference in a time of ‘crisis’35 in which there 
was a “direct challenge to the legitimacy of the constitutional and federal system”36 
in Canada. While commentators have characterized the Court’s reasoning in the 
Secession Reference as resorting to “abstract normativity…[and]…extra-ordinary 
adjudication”37 and reflecting “strategic decision making” rooted in an effort to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the Court as a federal institution,38 Schertzer’s analysis 
suggests that the impact of this decision was much broader. Schertzer argues 
that the Secession Reference is an “exemplar” of recognizing the federation as 
the process and outcome of negotiations and of the way in which the federal 
arbiter can legitimize competing perspectives of the federation. A bird’s eye 
view of the empirical analysis finds that the Secession Reference marked a shift in 
SCC federalism jurisprudence from imposing a particular federal model towards 
“recogniz[ing] the legitimacy of multiple federal models and the federation as the 
process and outcome of negotiation between the subscribers of these models.”39
34. In this advisory judgment the SCC considered three specific questions relating to the legality of 
unilateral secession by the province of Quebec under Canadian and international law. Secession 
Reference, supra note 11 at para 2 (for full text of the questions referred to the Court).
35. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 140.
36. Ibid at 164.
37. See Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, “Constitutional Theory and The Quebec Secession 
Reference” (2000) 13:2 Can JL & Jur 143 at 168. Choudhry and Howse highlight three 
unconventional aspects of the decision. First, they point out the decision’s “reliance on 
abstract, unwritten constitutional principles” beyond the written text of the constitution 
to create a new framework for governing secession. Ibid at 149, see also 154. Second, they 
reference the decision’s interpretative responsibility, namely the Court’s decision to vest 
“primary responsibility for contextualizing the constitutional rules governing secession” with 
political actors rather than the courts. Ibid at 149, see also 157). Third, they highlight the 
decision’s interpretative style, specifically the Court’s articulation of “a normative vision for 
the Canadian constitutional order.” Ibid at 164.
38. See e.g. Vuk Radmilovic, “Strategic Legitimacy Cultivation at the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Quebec Secession Reference and Beyond” (2010) 43:4 Can J Pol Sci 843.
39. Schertzer, supra note 1 at 220. Under Schertzer’s framework of analysis, seventy-eight per 
cent of post-Secession Reference federalism jurisprudence reflected a recognizing approach, 
as opposed to merely forty-three per cent of federalism jurisprudence pre-Secession Reference.
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Schertzer substantiates this argument by devoting chapters five and six to 
analyzing decisions in the imposing and recognizing streams of SCC jurisprudence. 
In these chapters, Schertzer summarizes the key characteristics of an imposing as 
opposed to a recognizing case, the trends that emerge within these two streams 
of jurisprudence, and the corresponding implications for the legitimacy of 
the federation.
The analysis presented in Part II raises two interconnected issues. First, 
as Schertzer notes at the onset of his book, the apex court does not exist in a 
vacuum. Rather, it is a part of the very system that is being contested. Accordingly, 
as commentators have suggested in relation to the Secession Reference, the Court 
is attuned to the social and political implications of the decisions it must render. 
This begs the question of the degree to which the circumstances surrounding 
a particular case may influence the impetus to advance an “imposing” versus 
an “accommodating” stance by the Court. The temporal and substantive ranges 
in the cases Schertzer analyzes demonstrate that the trends identified transcend 
particular points of conflict or issues. However, the analysis is confined primarily 
to an investigation of the decisions rendered, with a secondary focus on the 
political and social climate surrounding the decision and their actual impacts 
on perceptions of legitimacy within the federation. These may serve as fruitful 
areas for future research, building on the rich data set generated by Schertzer’s 
empirical study.
Second, one may grapple with whether the SCC is, in fact, imposing or 
recognizing certain models in its decision, or whether it is instead more accurate 
to suggest that decisions are driven by doctrine and the factual circumstances of 
a case. To this point, Schertzer contends that “underlying theories of federalism 
structure judicial decision making,”40 and that, as discussed above, it is not 
solely the disposition of a decision that holds force but rather the reasoning and 
depiction of the federation that rationalize the outcome. Schertzer illustrates this 
by recasting the SCC’s analysis in Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan in order 
to demonstrate that legitimizing competing views of the federation may not be 
mutually exclusive with the necessity of adjudicating an outcome.41
40. Ibid at 282.
41. Ibid at 283-85; Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC), [1991] 2 SCR 525, 
83 DLR (4th) 297.
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III. CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL AND NATIONAL FEDERAL 
THEORY
While the book centres on Canada as a case study, Schertzer contextualizes his 
analysis within broader federal theory. The Judicial Role in a Diverse Federation 
provides a rich theoretical and empirical foundation for comparative study 
that may be used to inform conflict management in other plurinational federal 
states and states where “conflict over the nature of nationality”42 is prevalent. 
Furthermore, the application of Schertzer’s ideal model to the SCC highlights the 
importance of the federal arbiter and serves as a window of comparison for other 
federal states into how decision making by apex courts may affect legitimacy.
In recent years, studies of traditional topics of federalism in Canada have 
arguably given way to rights-oriented scholarship focusing on the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.43 The ideas advanced in this book and the 
granularity of the empirical analysis provide a basis for future scholarship on 
federalism theory and jurisprudence in Canada. In particular, as Canadian legal 
and political spheres respond to the call to action of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission report44 and begin to act on a commitment to reconciliation with 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada, governments and courts will be called upon 
to negotiate a comprehensive vision of the federation in which Aboriginal 
self-government holds a fundamental and operative role.45 In this respect, 
42. Ibid at 301.
43. See Patrick Fafard & François Rocher, “The Evolution of Federalism Studies in Canada: 
From Centre to Periphery” (2009) 52:2 Can Pub Adm 291.
44. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling the 
Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 
(Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, 2015).
45. As of 2015, Canada had signed twenty-two self-government agreements and there were 
approximately ninety self-government negotiation tables across the country. See Indigenous 
and Northern Affairs Canada, “Fact Sheet: Aboriginal Self-Government” (2 April 2015), 
online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016293/1100100016294>. Active scholarship 
exists on the role of federal theory and federalism to recognize, affirm, and implement 
Section 35 Aboriginal rights including the right to self-government. This scholarship suggests 
that theories of federalism in Canada can and should evolve to effectively operationalize 
Aboriginal rights. Of particular note is the potential for the courts and the Supreme Court 
of Canada to contribute by adapting legal doctrines of federalism when adjudicating 
disputes and defining the parameters that will govern the division of power and resources 
in this new era of the federation. See e.g. Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the 
Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) ch 6; Martin Papillon, 
“Towards Postcolonial Federalism? The Challenges of Aboriginal Self-Determination 
in the Canadian Context” in Alain-G Gagnon, ed, Contemporary Canadian Federalism: 
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Schertzer’s focus on Canada as a plurinational state is apt and timely. While 
the SCC’s post-Secession Reference shift may not reflect a calculated effort by the 
Court to follow a new federal model to the exclusion of others, Schertzer’s work 
gives pause for reflection on what may be achieved in a federation when conflicts 
that reach the highest legal arena are approached from a place of negotiation 
rather than imposition.
Foundations, Traditions, Institutions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 405; 
Martin Papillon & André Juneau, eds, Canada: The State of the Federation 2013: Aboriginal 
Multilevel Governance (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015); Mark Mancini, 
“Wandering Without a Torch: Federalism as a Guiding Light” (2016) 67 UNBLJ 369; Jean 
Leclair, “Federal Constitutionalism and Aboriginal Difference” (2006) 31:2 Queen’s LJ 521; 
Dwight G Newman, “Aboriginal ‘Rights’ as Powers: Section 35 and Federalism Theory” in 
Graeme Mitchell et al, eds, A Living Tree: The Legacy of 1982 in Canada’s Political Evolution 
(Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2007) 527.
